The Harms of Asking:
Towards a Comprehensive Treatment
of Sexual Harassment
Michael D. Vhayt
Commentators have discussed the legal consequences of acts
constituting sexual harassment' for some time, albeit with less concern than that shown by many writers on the subject today. In an
article that appeared fifty years ago, Calvert Magruder wrote that
women "have occasionally sought damages for mental distress and
humiliation on account of being addressed by a proposal of illicit
intercourse."' Magruder noted that these actions were rarely successful. Unless the proposal was incidental to a "recognized" tort
such as assault, battery, or trespass, recovery was "generally de''
nied, the view being, apparently, that there is no harm in asking. 1
Over the last ten years courts have found that there is harm in
asking-or, more precisely, harm caused by asking. Beginning in
1976 with the district court decision in Williams v. Saxbe4 and culminating in the summer of 1986 in the Supreme Court's decision in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,5 the federal courts have
found that sexual harassment may constitute sex discrimination.
The courts have concluded, for example, that those who make sexual advances in the workplace may violate Title VII if the alleged
t A.B. 1983, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.
I The definition of sexual harassment used here is based on that stated in Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982), citing 29 U.S.C. § 1604.11(a)(1981):
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Henson noted that such "advances," "requests," and "conduct"
could constitute sexual harassment if unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not
"solicit or invite" them. It regarded such conduct as "undesirable or offensive." 682 F.2d at
903. This definition is a prior version of that used in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986). For an examination of the differences, see notes 32-36 below and accompanying text.
2 Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1055 (1936).
3 Id. at 1055.
" 413 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds as Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
5 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986). [Editors' note: At press time, the United States
Reports has assigned a page citation for Vinson but has not published a report of the case.
All subsequent citations therefore refer to the Supreme Court Reporter.]
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victim proves that (1) but for the victim's gender, the alleged harasser would not have made the sexual advance, and (2) the advance placed a barrier between the victim and her job.
Not all are satisfied with the courts' recent treatment of sexual
harassment, however. On the one hand, some have questioned
whether the federal courts should ever hear harassment claims,
which resemble tort actions, under the discrimination laws. On
the other hand, others have objected that courts have erred by defining sexual harassment too narrowly: sexual harassment, according to these critics, is more than discrimination. For example, in
the employment context, some have argued that an employee who
suffers harassment deserves relief beyond mere reinstatement to
her job or an injunction to her employer ordering an anti-harassment education program.
This comment will look at the past, present, and future of sexual harassment as an actionable wrong. Part I will examine the history of actions involving sexual harassment, and will attend in particular to the reasons why the early courts refused to recognize
sexual harassment as discrimination. Part II will present the practical and theoretical limits of the theory that sexual harassment is
merely sexual discrimination. This analysis will show that the same
difficulties that hindered the early courts in recognizing sexual harassment as sex discrimination prevent modern-day courts from
recognizing harassment as more than sex discrimination; these difficulties include a misunderstanding of the nature of sexual harassment and a discomfort with interfering with matters of sexual conduct. Finally, Part III will suggest ways in which the legal system
can overcome the limitations implicit in defining sexual harassment as merely sex discrimination, so as to maintain theoretical
consistency, forge a consensus on sexual problems, and provide the
appropriate level of relief for victims of sexual harassment.
I.
A.

Before Williams: Harassment is not Discrimination

Until recent times, Magruder's observation that one could solicit with impunity was true. Unless the challenged acts involved
an assault or a battery, courts were reluctant to compensate plain6 See, for example, Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (Bork
dissenting from refusal to grant en banc hearing).
See, for example, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the

Workplace, 134 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1461 (1986).
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tiffs for harassment. Courts dismissed claims involving unwelcome
verbal advances, for example, on the theory that words alone are
not actionable unless they are defamatory.' The Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Reed v. Maley,9 for example, held that although
"[s]ociety and the moral sentiments of the people strongly condemn conduct" like indecent solicitation, there was no principle
furnishing a ground for legal redress.10 Where there was no physical injury, damages were too hard to prove, too "remote," and too
"metaphysical" for courts to assess.
While the courts generally refused actions based solely on verbal harassment, in cases employing traditional tort theories, courts
often regarded harassment as an aggravating factor that supported
compensation for nonphysical harms and awards of punitive damages." The courts also sometimes held special classes of harassers,
such as servants of public utilities, liable for their illicit proposals. 2 While the reasons offered by the courts for imposing liability
in these cases might not appeal to present-day opponents of sexual
harassment, 3 the courts' allowance of these claims may have been
prescient. As Thomas Street noted in 1906,
8 See, for example, Davis v. Richardson, 89 S.W. 318 (Ark. 1905), and see generally
Annotation, Indecent Proposal to Women as Assault, 12 A.L.R.2d 971 (1950). There were
some exceptions, however, to the words-alone theory. See, for example, State v. McIver, 231
N.C. 313, 56 S.E.2d 604 (1949) (black male convicted of criminal assault for making sexual
proposals to white female); State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956) (assault where
defendant deliberately and repeatedly expressed his "lustful desires" towards a female while
masturbating in his car).
Two states retain criminal laws that specifically prohibit indecent proposals towards
women. See S.C.Code Annot. § 16-15.250 (1976) and Va.Code § 18.2-417 (1950). New Mexico
has a more general insult statute, see N.M.Stat.Annot. § 30-3-1 (1978), and two other states
recognize a right to be free from personal insult, see Cal.Civ.Code § 43 (Deering 1941) and
Okla.Stat.Annot. tit. 76, § 6 (1951).
9 74 S.W. 1079, 5 Ky.L.R. 209 (1903).
10 74 S.W. at 1080-81.
11 See Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961) (punitive damages and award
for mental suffering, including "shame," appropriate for 65-year-old woman harassed by employer; assault and battery proven); Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc.2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689
(1960) (damages allowed for public disgrace, humiliation, mental and physical distress from
obscene phone calls and letter); Edmisten v. Dousette, 334 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.App. 1960)
(damages for worsened nervous condition resulting from physical advance). Similarly, in
criminal actions, the taking of "indecent liberties or familiarities" with a female, or the
purposeful infliction of shame or disrepute, were aggravating circumstances in many state
assault and battery laws during this period. See, for example, Maine v. Towers, 304 A.2d 75
(Me. 1973); South Carolina v. Hollman, 245 S.C. 362, 140 S.E.2d 597 (1965).
12 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 48 (1965) and cases cited in comments therein.
Is The dissent in Reed urged recognition of Maggie Reed's complaint because "[t]he
purity of woman and the sanctity of the marriage relation lie at the basis of our whole social
fabric, and attempts to destroy them are grave offenses." 74 S.W. at 1083 (Hobson
dissenting).
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The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor
belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A
factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It
is merely a question of social, economic and industrial needs
14
as those needs are reflected in the organic law.

In the 1960s and 1970s, an unparalleled combination of social,
economic, and industrial needs prompted recognition of sexual
harassment as an independent basis of liability. The advance of
the women's movement encouraged many women to speak out
against harassment. Moreover, as women entered the workforce in
greater numbers, men began to encounter them in what previously
had been male bastions. Some men responded with harassment. 15
For these reasons, reports of sexual harassment increased, and
with them the demands for relief.'6 These demands coincided with
the enactment of the modern civil rights laws. The most important
of these laws were the discrimination statutes, particularly Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,17 and later Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,18 as well as the amended version
of the Fair Housing Act.' 9
The first discrimination law to include sex as a prohibited category, Title VII, did not immediately enhance the prospects of relief for victims of sexual harassment. In fact, as late as the mid1970s, plaintiffs characteristically resorted to traditional legal theories in order to press harassment-related claims. 20 This was partly
because Congress did not pass Title VII as a measure explicitly
designed to cope with sexual harassment. In fact, gender was not
even included in the original draft of the statute, and, ironically,
was added only as an attempt by conservatives to derail the bill.2 1

"' Thomas Atkins Street, 1 Foundations of Legal Liability 470 (1906), quoted in Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 57 n.22 (5th ed. 1984).
" For more historical background, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women (1979) ("MacKinnon").
16For the actual numbers of sex discrimination suits, see U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Annual Reports (published yearly 1968-1982). For a representative
collection of articles, see MacKinnon at 295-96 n.176-78 (cited in note 15).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1982).
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
"
42 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (1982).
10 See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (breach of
contract action); Wiley v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga.App. 187, 213 S.E.2d 550 (1975)
(wrongful termination action); Gates v. Brockway Glass Co., 93 L.R.R.M. 2367 (C.D.Cal.
1976) (action against union for breach of duty of fair representation).
21 See 110 Cong.Rec. 2577-84 (1964). In 1964, a true anti-sex discrimination constitu-
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When plaintiffs first began to bring sexual harassment claims
under Title VII, the courts rejected them. In Barnes v. Train, for
example, the district court held that despite Congress' desire to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment in employment, a supervisor's retaliation against a female employee for her
refusal to submit to his advances was essentially "underpinned by
the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship. '22 No
matter how inexcusable his advances were, they were not prohibited by Title VII.2 The district court suggested that the supervisor's act of retaliation discriminated not on the basis of the plaintiff's gender, but on the basis of other "personal" factors not
prohibited by Title VII.
The district court in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.24 also focused on the "personal" aspects of sexual harassment. In that case,
a supervisor repeatedly made verbal and physical advances towards two female employees who were allegedly forced to quit because of his behavior. The court held that the supervisor's actions
arose from the supervisor's "personal urge," which was distinct
from Bausch & Lomb's company policies. Only the latter could
provide a basis for a Title VII claim. Further, the Corne court concluded that allowing suits for harassment under Title VII was "ludicrous" for two reasons. First, if the activity in question was directed equally against males, Title VII would not apply. The court
inferred from this that Congress had not intended to redress sexual harassment through the discrimination laws. Second, the court
believed that if it held this conduct to be discrimination, all "amorous or sexually oriented advances" among employees would become actionable. This would force employers to hire "asexual" em2 5
ployees in order to avoid liability.
In 1976, the year following Corne, two other courts decided
that Title VII did not cover sexual harassment, basing their decisions upon a concern for the possibility of an unmanageable in-

ency was nascent. See generally Sarah Evans, Personal Politics (1979). It was not until passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., that Congress expressly reaffirmed its opposition to sex discrimination in the workplace. "[D]iscrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and . . . it is to be accorded the same
degree of concern given to any type of similarly unlawful conduct." See Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, Sen.Rep.No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971).
22 13 F.E.P Cases 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd as Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C.Cir. 1977) (ultimately finding discrimination).
2 13 F.E.P Cases at 124.
2 390 F.Supp. 161 (D.Ariz. 1975), vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
25 390 F.Supp. at 163-64.
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crease in the number of claims. The court in Miller v. Bank of
America2 began by characterizing the sexual advances of the
plaintiff's supervisor as "unauthorized isolated sex-related acts"
that could not constitute the acts of Bank of America. Only if the
employer had actively or tacitly approved personnel policies requiring sexual favors as a condition of employment would there be
a Title VII violation. Otherwise, the court reasoned, if harassment
were discrimination, then every firing or failure to promote could
be turned into a discrimination action. Further, because it felt that
sexual attraction was pervasive, the Miller court doubted its capacity to distinguish actual illegal harassment from harmless flirtation-yet another reason to anticipate an unmanageable increase
incases. 7
The district court in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
28
Co.

reached a similar conclusion, but by different reasoning. Title

VII was "not intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what
amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire" simply because the attack occurred in the workplace, not in a "back alley."
Permitting such actions would open the floodgates, creating a need
''
for "4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400. 29
By the mid-1970s, however, the courts could no longer maintain that there was no harm in asking. They had to admit that
there was harm, but most insisted that there was no law against it.
Sexual harassment could not be discrimination on the part of the
employer, they reasoned, because sexual advances were "personal,"
or at least something that one could rarely attribute to an employer. They also invoked the lack of explicit congressional intent
to make sexual harassment a form of prohibited sex discrimination. And even if sexual harassment were discrimination, the
courts argued, it was a type that was too hard to judge, seemingly
impossible to remedy, and potentially too widespread for the system to handle. In raising these objections, however, the courts disregarded the purposes of the very statutes they so earnestly cited
in barring these actions-statutes that prohibit discrimination
without regard for the difficulties of particular cases, the ease of
remedy, or the magnitude of the problem that they address.
24

1979).

418 F.Supp. 233 (N.D.Cal. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.

418 F.Supp. at 236.
422 F.Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976) ("Tomkins I"), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977)
(ultimately finding actionable harassment).
29 422 F.Supp. at 556, 557.
2
28
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B. After Williams: Harassment is Discrimination
In order to win their discrimination actions, sexually harassed
plaintiffs realized that they had to convince the courts that harassment involved more than "personal" acts. Victory in this effort
came when plaintiffs confronted the courts with the most flagrant
examples of harassment. Such was the case in the first district
court decision to recognize sexual harassment as a Title VII violation, Williams v. Saxbe. Diane Williams, an employee of the Department of Justice, refused her supervisor's sexual advances. Her
supervisor retaliated with annoying comments, unfavorable reviews, and unwarranted reprimands. While maintaining that "nonemployment related personal encounters" were not actionable
under Title VII, the court held that it was improper for a supervisor, whom the court regarded as an agent of the employer, to retaliate against an employee for refusing to comply with an illegitimate, discriminatory employment condition-in this case, a
demand for sexual favors.30
Soon thereafter, courts began holding that plaintiffs made out
a prima facie case of sexual harassment if they proved facts
similiar to those involved in Williams: an employer or a supervisor's demand for sexual favors in return for a job, a promotion, or
other benefits. 31 It made sense that Title VII protected victims of
this kind of conduct, which became known as "quid pro quo" harassment. Title VII explicitly forbids discrimination in the terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.2 In quid pro quo cases,
an employer or his agent explicitly ties the terms, conditions, and
privileges of the victim's employment to factors which are arbitrary and unrelated to job performance.
The Title VII quid pro quo cases opened the door for harassment actions under other discrimination statutes. In Alexander v.
Yale University,3 the court determined that an educational institution's failure to respond to complaints of sexual harassment constituted grounds for a Title IX action. State courts likewise
adopted the Williams rationale and held quid pro quo harassment
to be illegal under state discrimination statutes, including those
11

Williams, 413 F.Supp. at 662.
31 See, for example, Garber v. Saxon Business Products, 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Tomkins Ir'); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451
F.Supp. 1382 (D.Colo. 1978).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
33 459 F.Supp. 1 (D.Conn. 1977).
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prohibiting housing discrimination. 4 Similarly, in several cases
where state government employers were found to be quid pro quo
harassers, courts allowed § 1983 actions for violation of federal
35
rights.
In addition to applying the Title VII quid pro quo analysis to
claims brought under other statutes, the courts began to define
harassment more broadly. For example, in Wright v. Methodist
Youth Services, Inc., the court held that quid pro quo harassment
on the part of a male homosexual supervisor was illegal.3 6 The
EEOC's promulgation of guidelines on sexual harassment, however, prompted a more sweeping extension of the strictures of the
discrimination laws. 3 7 The guidelines first codified what the courts
31 Most of these claims were brought under state counterparts to Title VII. See, for
example, Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F.Supp. 645 (E.D.Mich. 1982) (pursuant to
Mich.Comp.Laws Annot. §§ 37.2101 et seq. (West 1985)); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d
958 (D.C.App. 1985) (pursuant to D.C.Code §§ 1-2501 et seq. (1981)).
A claim of illegal quid pro quo harassment by a landlord was made in Chomicki v.
Wittekind, 128 Wis.2d 188, 381 N.W.2d 561 (1985). There the plaintiff, a tenant suing under
Wisconsin's fair housing law, Wisc.Stat.Annot. § 101.22 (West 1973), won a verdict against a
landlord who had evicted her for having refused his advances. The court declared that the
purposes of the employment discrimination and fair housing laws were the same; "only their
fields of operation differ." 381 N.W.2d at 564. A similar claim under the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1982), was upheld in Shellhammer v. Lewallen, No. 843573 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985) (available on LEXIS).
35 See Huebschen v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, 547 F.Supp. 1168 (W.D.Wisc.
1982). Huebschen, a male, filed various claims against a state agency and his female supervisor, charging harassment which violated Title VII. He sought relief under both Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Huebschen based his § 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive damages on two theories. First, he argued that by violating Title VII, the state became
liable to him under the federal laws provision of § 1983. Second, he argued that by intentionally discriminating against him on the basis of sex, the state denied him equal protection-independent of its duty under Title VII not to discriminate against him on the basis
of sex. The trial court ordered the supervisor to pay $25,000 in damages based on the first
theory and did not address the second.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the first theory,
but ruled that since Huebschen could not sue his supervisor in her individual capacity
under Title VII, a § 1983 action based on a Title VII violation could not state a cause of
action against her. Huebschen v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167, 1170-71
(7th Cir. 1983). The court then examined Huebschen's equal protection claim. While accepting the theory behind the claim, the court determined that Huebschen was not harassed
because he was a man, but rather because he was his supervisor's former lover-a group that
was not a protected class. Id. at 1171-72.
11 511 F.Supp. 307 (N.D.II. 1981). See also Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation, 597
F.Supp. 537 (M.D.Ala. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (male homosexual supervisor harassed male worker).
37 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986). The EEOC's definition of sexual harassment is somewhat
confusing, however. The guidelines were intended to explain what behavior constitutes discrimination under Title VII. See 45 Fed.Reg. 25024 (1980). In its first draft of the guidelines, the EEOC described sexual harassment as "unwelcome behavior." It then stated three
criteria that separated advances that established a "purely personal, social relationship

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:328

had already held, that quid pro quo harassment in the workplace
violates Title VII. But then the EEOC stepped further. Reading
the word "condition" in Title VII more broadly than any court in a
sexual harassment case had, the EEOC held that discriminatory
harassment could stem not only from a superior's actions, but also
from coworkers' actions.38 The EEOC claimed that its broader
reading aligned sexual harassment law with that applied to racial,
religious, and national origin harassment.3 9 A person would be illegally discriminating when his behavior had "the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
40
environment.
This new category of harassment became known as "environmental" harassment. By actively or constructively permitting his
workplace to be polluted with sexual harassment, an employer is
held to have created a discriminatory condition-the very harm
that Title VII seeks to correct. In the past, victims of environmental harassment had been unable to prove their claims under the
discrimination statutes if they lacked proof of an abuse of power
41
by an employer, or proof of a discriminatory institutional policy.
Following publication of the EEOC's guidelines, however, the
courts eagerly extended Title VII to prohibit environmental harassment occurring in the workplace. A state court took the lead. In
Continental Can Co. v. State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an employer was responsible for the harassment of one employee towards another when the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment but failed to take timely and
42
appropriate action to prevent or remedy it.

without a discriminatory employment effect" from those that discriminated. Id. The final
draft gives the impression, however, that "unwelcome behavior" becomes harassment only
when it discriminates. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986). The EEOC is correct that this behavior is
actionable when it results in different terms, privileges, or conditions of employment, but it
is wrong to suggest that this behavior is not harassment when it is not discriminatory. Much
that can be characterized as harassment will escape the sanctions of the discrimination laws,
as the Supreme Court and other courts recognize. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
106 S.Ct. at 2405-06, and Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
" See 45 Fed.Reg. 25024 (1980). See also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45
(D.C.Cir. 1981); Henson, 682 F.2d at 902-903; Comment, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 61 Boston Univ.L.Rev. 535, 543-46 (1981). This "alignment" has not
been perfect however. See notes 72-74, 80-81 and accompanying text.
40 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1986).
41 See, for example, Come, 390 F.Supp. at 163 (Title VII does not prohibit environmental harassment); Alexander, 459 F.Supp. at 3 (barring Title IX environmental claim).
42 297 N.W.2d 241, 248 (Minn. 1980). The state based its action on Minnesota's statu-
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The EEOC's view of sexual harassment triumphed in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 43 The Supreme Court held that environmental sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII when it is so severe or pervasive that it affects
the terms, conditions, or privileges of a person's employment.
"Without question," wrote Justice Rehnquist,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminates" on the
basis of sex ....
[Similarly], [n]othing in Title VII suggests
that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual
harassment should not be likewise prohibited.4 4
On this point, the Court was unanimous. The evolution that this
statement represents, from Train's view that harassment is an outgrowth of inharmonious personal relationships to a recognition
that many forms of harassment are discriminatory, is nothing short
of remarkable. And it took only twelve years.
II.
The course of sexual harassment law under the discrimination
statutes has been one of ever-widening interpretation. The courts
have covered much ground, and one can expect that they will further expand the legal definition of sexual discrimination. One can
anticipate, for example, the courts' application of the environmental harassment reasoning to claims brought under other discrimination statutes apart from Title VII.4 5 In their efforts to respond
tory analog to Title VII, Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (1978). The court followed Title
VII case law in interpreting the act. Continental Can, 297 N.W.2d at 246-8. The Minnesota
legislature subsequently codified the Continental Can decision. See Minn.Stat. § 363.01,
subd. 10(a) (1986 Supp.).
43 106 S.Ct. 2399 (1986). Ironically, by the time the Supreme Court examined the
EEOC guidelines in Vinson, the EEOC seemed to be reconsidering some of its words. See
the Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, No. 84-1979 (Dec. 11, 1985) ("Brief for
EEOC") (suggesting that the Court adopt, among other things, a rule that plaintiffs suing
employers for hostile environment be required to exhaust internal grievance procedures).
44 106 S.Ct. at 2404-05 (emphasis in the original).
45 As noted in the text accompanying notes 33-35 above, cases brought under other
discrimination laws typically follow Title VII's lead on sexual harassment. A recent Title IX
case, for example, has allowed an environmental discrimination claim in an education setting. See Moire v. Temple University School of Medecine, 613 F.Supp. 1360, 1366-67
(E.D.Pa. 1985), afl'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). By contrast, because plaintiffs can plead
intentional discrimination toward a class under § 1983 (see note 35 above), courts recognized environmental discrimination claims earlier under the equal protection clause than
under Title VII. See Woerner v. Brzeczek, 519 F.Supp. 517 (N.D.MI. 1981). In these cases,
while there initially was some dispute as to what level of environmental harassment
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to the problem of sexual harassment, however, the courts have
overlooked legitimate questions. In doing so, they have perpetuated some of the myths about harassment. Part II of this comment
will address two broader questions about the law governing sexual
harassment: does the current legal treatment of sexual harassment
fully serve the purposes of discrimination law, and does discrimination law adequately address the harms of sexual harassment?
A. Are Courts "Bootstrapping" Sexual Harassment Claims from
Discrimination Statutes?
In his dissent from the D.C. Circuit's denial to grant an en
banc rehearing in Vinson, Judge Robert Bork criticized the general
trend of sexual harassment cases as unlimited, wide-ranging excursions into matters outside the scope of the discrimination law. "Title VII," Judge Bork wrote, "was passed to outlaw discriminatory
behavior and not simply behavior of which we strongly disapprove."4" Here Judge Bork echoed the language of the early courts
which had refused to entertain sexual harassment claims on these
very grounds. Were these courts in fact correct? Are sexual harassment cases just "bootstraps" on discrimination statutes, happily
stretched out by judges who "strongly disapprove" of aggressive
sexual behavior?
To answer this question, one must begin with the language of
the statute. Title VII states that it is "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer

. . .

to discriminate against any individ-

ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '47 The statute does not define
"discriminate," but the term must, at a minimum, include decisions to favor or disfavor one person relative to another based
upon prohibited classifications. The Supreme Court has described
this type of discrimination, labelled disparate treatment discrimination, as "the most easily understood type of discrimination. ' ' 48
amounts to intentional discrimination, Vinson seems to have made this showing easier. See
Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 622 F.Supp. 1234, 1246-47 (N.D.Ind. 1985) (decided before
Vinson) (city not liable for intentional discrimination merely because it failed to act on
plaintiff's complaints of harassment), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185-87
(7th Cir. 1986) (decided after Vinson) (quid pro quo harassment, knowledge of environmental harassment, and failure to enact anti-harassment policies or to investigate complaints
constitutes discrimination).
46 Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d at 1333 n.7 (Bork dissenting).
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
48 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
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Where does sexual harassment fit in? The core of the typical
harassment victim's claim is that she has been treated less favorably than her male counterpart-in other words, it is a disparate
treatment claim. But if disparate treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination, then why was it so difficult for the
early courts to understand that sexual harassment constituted discrimination? Is it that the early courts were blind, but now we see?
Yes and no. The early courts recognized that harassers were
treating some persons differently from others. They stumbled at
the next step of the inquiry: what motivated the harassment and
was it impermissible? Today, the chief inquiry in most disparate
treatment cases is whether there was an invidious motivation. The
question, "Did the defendant intentionally decide to treat the individual less favorably on the basis of race, sex, or other prohibited
grounds?" is so important in the typical disparate treatment case
that the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green divided
the burdens of production on this question into three parts: First,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding
her treatment give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
If this demonstration is made, it creates a rebuttable presumption,
one that forces the defendant to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his action. The plaintiff can then rebut the defendant by demonstrating that his excuse is a pretext for discrimination. 9 While the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proof of
intentional discrimination, 50 the McDonnell Douglas scheme allows the judge or jury to find discriminatory motivation on the basis of inferential, as opposed to direct, evidence.
Although the early courts had the tools with which to probe
the harasser's intent, the courts did not put them to good use.
They would not recognize that the intent to engage in sexual relations with an employee contains the intent to discriminate. In
Train, the court suggested that an inharmonious personal relationship, not the plaintiff's gender, was the motivation behind the unfavorable treatment.5 1 In Tomkins I, the court stated that sexual
desire prompted the harasser, and to probe his intent further
would require the courts to craft rules that would be judicially im-

(1977).
49 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).

50 See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
51 See note 22 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit in Huebschen made a similar inquiry in assessing the plaintiff's claim of intentional discrimination, with the same
result. See note 35.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[55:328

prudent and unenforceable. 2 The courts in these cases, along with
those in Corne and Miller,53 denied relief because they concluded
that the motives underlying sexual harassment had little to do
with prohibited gender classifications.
One can posit two potential justifications for the early courts'
unwillingness to see sexual harassment as discrimination. One reason, the courts' reluctance to enter the fray, withers in the face of
the mandate of the discrimination laws. If a plaintiff proves that
her employer treated her differently on the basis of a prohibited
ground, then the courts must hold that employer liable under Title
VII-even if such a result would "inevitably" lead to the need for
four hundred, four thousand, or four million trial judges. Certainly
there are times when a court should construe a statute so as to
avoid a ridiculous result. That practice dates back to Blackstone.
But Blackstone coupled this principle of statutory interpretation
with other tools of construction such as legislative purpose, plain
meaning, subject matter, and context.5 ' Unfortunately, not one of
the early cases employing the "ridiculous results" rationale used
any of the other tools of statutory interpretation. Moreover, the
unmanageable deluge of sexual harassment suits that the courts
feared has not materialized.
The second possible reason for the early results is more intriguing, for it embodies a problem that might survive the Supreme Court's decision in Vinson. Many of the early courts sincerely stated that sexual harassment has little to do with gender
lines-that sexual expressions are the result of "personal" forces
presumably inherent in one's biological, chemical, or psychological
nature. Sustained studies of harassment, however, have proven
that this belief is largely incorrect.
The first theorists who studied sexual harassment explained
that the practice was rooted in class perceptions. One theory, articulated by Lin Farley in 197811 and given greater focus by Catharine MacKinnon, describes harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power.

5' 6

The central problem of harassment is, in Mac-

Kinnon's view, "the use of power derived from one social sphere to
'2 See

note 28 and accompanying text.

63 See notes 24 and 27 and accompanying text.
4 See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *59-61.
55 Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job (1978).
"I MacKinnon at 1 (cited in note 15).
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lever benefits or impose deprivations in another."5 7
A second explanation of harassment, one growing out of a series of empirical studies of working women by Barbara Gutek and
others, describes harassment as part of a larger problem of "sexrole spillover"-the inappropriate use of gender roles in the workplace. 5 Gutek gives three reasons why such spillover occurs. First,
sex roles are more basic cognitive categories than are work roles.
Second, many women choose, or are forced to adopt, a stereotypical sex role at work. Some will act like a flirt, for example, in order
to be accepted at the workplace. Third, many men are uncomfortable with women in a work role, and as a result many revert to familiar sex roles. Regardless of the reason, however, when sex roles
are injected into the workplace, sexual expressions often follow.59
When these expressions lack mutuality and present a barrier to
work, they become harassment.
Gutek's findings show that harassment is tied to gender. Perceptions of sex roles informed by gender stereotypes, coercion to
assume a stereotypical role, and lapses into stereotypical behavior
all invoke gender lines-the very thing that the discrimination
laws prohibit.6 0 The early cases thus reveal a basic misunderstanding of sexual harassment. In light of what is now known about sexual harassment, the argument that sexual harassment is merely
personal breaks down.
The Williams court and its progeny, however, did not immediately grasp the reasons for the earlier courts' failure to see discriminatory intent in sexual harassment. Although the Williams court
characterized harassment as an illegitimate condition, it did not
hold that the sexual advance itself violated Title VII-rather, the
17 Id. Those who share MacKinnon's views state their case in two ways. One is that in
particular contexts, sexual harassment reinforces the organization's hierarchy, which is typically male-dominated. The second description is related: sexual harassment is an expression
of the larger inequitable distribution of power throughout society in favor of males. For a
useful summary of these positions, see Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace 8-15
(1985) ("Gutek").
" Gutek developed her theory because predictions based on the MacKinnon model
were incongruent with the results of attitudinal studies of sexual harassment in the workplace, particularly on the question of why harassers expressed sexual interest. Gutek at 15.
Many of the themes developed by Farley and MacKinnon resonate in Gutek's work, however. Gutek found, for example, that sex-role spillover was higher in work environments
where occupations, jobs, or work groups were not integrated. Gutek at 129-51.
59Gutek at 15-18, 66-68 (cited in note 57).
60 Although voluntary assumption of a sex-role might be a different matter, it may be
possible to put aside this objection. Given the pervasiveness of sexism in American society, a
truly voluntary choice may be impossible.
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supervisor's retaliation was the court's key concern."' It was not
until the D.C. Circuit reviewed the Train decision in Barnes v.
Costle that a court began to find discriminatory intent in the sexual advance itself. "The vitiating sex factor," stated the court,
stemmed from the imposition by Barnes' superior of "a condition
which ostensibly he would not have fastened upon a male employee. . . .But for her womanhood, from aught that appears, her
participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited .... [I]t is enough that gender is a factor contributing to the
discrimination in a substantial way."'62 Barnes' refusal precipitated
retaliation. Since her sex was a significant element behind the invitation, and since refusal of the solicitation prompted retaliation,
gender was a substantial factor behind the retaliation, and the har63
assment constituted a violation of Title VII.
With its shift in focus toward the sexual advance, the court in
Costle created a logical framework that effectively ended further
debate over the harasser's intent in sexual harassment cases.4 The
Eleventh Circuit reflected this development five years later in
Henson v. City of Dundee.15 The court in Henson formally listed
the elements of what it saw as the prima facie Title VII sexual
harassment action, and the majority of sexual harassment deci61 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. at 660-62. Even on remand, the court remained concerned with abuse of employer power. See Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F.Supp. 1387, 1389
(D.D.C. 1980).
62 561 F.2d 983, 989 n.49, 990 (D.C.Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
63 Id. at 990. The appeals court rejected the lower court's holding that Barnese member-

ship in the class of those who had spurned the supervisor's advances, and not her sex, was
the factor prompting retaliation. See also notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
64 The debate since Costle has been largely over employer liability for an employee's
prohibited conduct. See, for example, Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F.Supp.
480 (E.D.Wisc. 1979) (no employer liability unless employer actively or tacitly sanctioned
practice); Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co., 21 FEP Cases 452 (E.D.La. 1979), aff'd 624 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1980) (no liability if employer ignorant of supervisor's actions or if, upon
learning, employer takes appropriate action); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th
Cir. 1982) (employer liable if (1) supervisor abuses powers that employer has granted to him
or (2) employer knew or should have known of hostile environment created by supervisor);
Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2407-09 (declining to issue definitive rule on employer liability, but
suggesting that common law agency principles are applicable).
See also Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of
Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 1007, 1025-31 (1978);
Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
Harv.L.Rev. 1449, 1460-63 (1984); Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U.Rev.L. & Soc.Change 83 (1984); Note, Employer Liability
Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87
Colum.L.Rev. 1258 (1987).
65 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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sions since 1982 have adopted the court's approach. 6 The elements
of the Henson test are:
(1) A belongs to a protected group (that is, A is a man or a
woman).
(2) B subjected A to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) B would not have harassed A "but for the fact of [A's]
7
sex."
(4) B's harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
A's employment.6 8
(5) A's employer was responsible for B's act.

9

The Henson analysis comes close to serving the purposes of
discrimination law, but it is not perfect in its theory or application.
As the Supreme Court stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., "[w]hat
is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment where the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. '7 0 Only the first, third, and fifth Henson elements serve this goal. Under the first element, A must establish
her membership in a protected class. The third element requires A
to meet the accepted standard of causation for discrimination
cases, one that allows a plaintiff to prevail even if unprohibited
factors partially motivated the disparate treatment. 1 Under the
0'
For recent cases, see Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2406; MoyIan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Flagship Intern., 793
F.2d 714, 719-22 (5th Cir. 1986); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat. Management Co., 805 F.2d 644,
648 (6th Cir. 1986).
6" Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04. The but for test is adopted from Costle. See 561 F.2d at
990-91. The test was another of the federal courts' formulations of the standard of causation
under Title VII, and was much stricter than those previously used. See Mark S. Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective,
82 Colum.L.Rev. 292, 308-10 (1982).
61 Henson held that in quid pro quo cases, any affect on the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment met this fourth element. 682 F.2d at 909. For environmental harassment, the harassment had to be "sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the
psychological well-being" of the employee. Id. at 904.
" For example, B was A's employer, B was an agent of A's employer, or A's employer
knew or should have known of B's act. Id. at 905. But see note 64 for the current debate on
employer liability.
70 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
71 Mark Brodin suggests that the courts should bifurcate causation analysis into one
standard for liability, another for relief. Brodin, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 292 (cited in note 67). See
also Michael J. Zimmer and Charles A. Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual Dis-
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fifth element, A must establish employer liability, a necessary
proof under Title VII since that statute targets only the conduct of
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies.
By contrast, the second and fourth Henson elements fail to
further the goals enunciated in Griggs. The allegation and proof of
unwelcomeness, which the Court in Vinson called "[t]he gravamen
of any sexual harassment claim,' ' 7 2 raises two concerns. First, Vinson, Henson, and the EEOC guidelines do not explain why a victim of this form of discriminatory harassment, as opposed to racial,
religious, or national origin harassment, must prove that the offensive activity was unwelcome. The McDonnell Douglas burden of
proof analysis does not mandate such a showing, nor does Title
VII. Further, most areas of the law do not require a victim to anticipate her antagonist's defenses in her prima facie case, and Title
VII is no exception. Welcomeness in this context is most analogous
to a justification for the defendant's act, an issue which the McDonnell Douglas scheme requires the defendant to raise.7 3 The
plaintiff should not bear the burden of rebutting the defendant's
affirmative defense in her prima facie case.
In its brief in Vinson, the EEOC argued in favor of unwelcomeness as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. To
justify placing this burden on the sexual harassment plaintiff, the
agency asserted that sexual harassment differs from other classbased harassment because some sexual expressions are normal in
the workplace. The EEOC thus concluded that special rules are
warranted so as to avoid intrusions into "purely personal, social
relationships. ' 4 The EEOC argued that courts must insist that
plaintiffs demonstrate unwelcomeness in sexual harassment suits
in order to "ensure that sexual harassment charges do not become
a tool by which one party to a consensual sexual relationship may
'7 5
punish the other.
The EEOC's argument in Vinson illustrates that the Henson
unwelcomeness test is at root the product of an outdated stereotype. As Susan Estrich points out, the notion that people, chiefly
women, misuse legal protections against sexual invasions to accuse
the innocent is quite old. The justification has been repeatedly

parate Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination, and Burdens of Proof, 9 Harv.Women's L.J. 25, 45 (1986).
1 Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2406.
73 411 U.S. at 802-4.
7" Brief for EEOC at 13 (cited in note 43).
7 Brief for EEOC at 15 (cited in note 43).
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used to impose greater burdens of proof on victims of alleged sexual invasions. 76 While the issue of consent cannot be ignored entirely in sexual harassment cases, the moment the courts begin creating exceptions to discrimination law, they risk frustrating its
purposes. To require a showing of unwelcomeness in the prima facie case out of an unsubstantiated fear of spurned lovers' suits
amounts to judicial resistance to the purposes of the discrimination laws.
Moreover, it is unlikely that this novel criterion was developed
as a time saving rule-that is, if women have a propensity to welcome sexual advances, then the courts could conserve judicial resources by placing the burden of production concerning welcomeness on the plaintiff. One could speculate that the courts have
placed the burden of proof of unwelcomeness on the victim of sexual harassment for many of the same reasons that the law traditionally required rape victims to prove lack of consent." But many
states now place the burden of proof of consent in rape cases on
the accused. 8 Many of the rationales for this change are applicable
in the sexual harassment context. By focusing on the accused's
conduct, rather than the victim's, the law recognizes that in some
situations, particularly those in which the accused holds an advantage over his victim, the task of proving lack of consent may be
difficult.
In addition to improperly allocating the welcomeness issue to
the plaintiff, the Henson "unwelcomeness" element has a second
problem: its subjectivity. The court defines unwelcome "in the
sense that the employee did not solicit or incite [the conduct], and
in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable
or offensive. ' This definition not only raises the affirmative defense problem noted above, but it also requires the victim to prove
her subjective response to the harasser's act-something which is
(again) a judicial creation that is not mandated by the discrimination laws. Moreover, this approach might also disadvantage defendants if a plaintiff regards as undesirable conduct that most
would find unobjectionable.
Perhaps more importantly, there is the complication of unwilling submission to sexual advances. The sexual harasser may view
76 Susan Estrich, Real Rape 5 (1987).

" See id. at 5, 8,29-41, 57-59.
See, for example, IU.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, §§ 12-13, 12-17(a) (1985) (consent is a defense
to criminal sexual assault; proof of lack of consent is not an element of the offense).
11 Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
78
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submission as "welcoming" his behavior. From the perspective of
the sexual object, the victim merely is choosing the lesser of two
evils: enduring harassment or suffering the consequences. Even at
the early stages of sexual innuendos and relationships, an employee may fear the repercussions of rebuffing or disappointing the
more powerful sexual aggressor. This hypothetical is not farfetched, and it easily demonstrates the difficulties a victim has in
proving unwelcomeness.
Some of these subjectivity problems resurface in the fourth element of the Henson test, which requires a showing that B's harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of A's employment.
In keeping with the EEOC guidelines, the courts in workplace environmental harassment cases have required a plaintiff to show
that the harassment had "the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. ' 80 This
has led courts in sexual harassment cases to inquire into an employee's subjective response to harassment, raising conceptual
problems that are not a part of most other types of discrimination
cases. If the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment truly codified
the then-existing law on racial and national origin harassment, the
objection to the subjectivity of Henson's fourth element would apply to racial, religious, and national origin harassment cases as well
as sexual harassment cases. But, curiously, it is not clear whether
current racial, religious, and national origin harassment cases follow the same scheme that the Henson court adopts.8 1
The preferred approach would be to adopt a reasonable
worker standard. This would ensure even-handed liability and deterrence in all working environments. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Judge Newblatt argued that if courts had to determine the
reasonableness of the alleged harassment, they would have to consider things such as the nature of the employment environment,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1986).
"I See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting fourth
element of Henson test in race case); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390,
1394 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding racial harassment where environment "significantly and adversely affects the psychological well-being of an employee"); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic
Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Minority Police Officers v. City
of South Bend, 617 F.Supp. 1330, 1352-53 (N.D.Ind. 1985), aft'd, 801 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.
1986) (adopting same standard at first, but hinting at an objective "excessive and opprobrious" test); Weiss v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D.Va. 1984) (adopting objective test in religion case). Some courts, however, have opted for an objective standard in
sexual harassment cases. See, for example, Volk v. Coler, 638 F.Supp. 1555, 1559 (C.D.Ill.
1986).
80
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the educational background of the alleged harasser and his victim,
the physical characteristics of the workplace, and even the victim's
reasonable expectations. Newblatt argues that such an inquiry
qualifies Title VII: "the standard for determining sex harassment
would be different depending upon the work environment." He
continues:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this. It
must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity
for the female workers of America. But it is quite different to
claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers."2
Newblatt pushes his point too far. Title VII and other discrimination laws cannot help but transform our social mores, as they
prohibit actions stemming from certain disfavored views of racial,
ethnic, religious, and gender groups. But he is correct to argue that
a subjective standard of conduct would allow the courts to consider
factors that would lower the tolerances for sexual aggression. Such
a version of a "reasonableness" test would essentially expose plaintiffs to the defense of assumption of risk. But Title VII does not
allow its "risks" to be assumed. Rather, the statute requires the
eradication of discrimination. Thus courts must establish objective
criteria for objectionable harassment, and hold employers liable regardless of the traditional environment.
An argument against applying a subjective analysis to the
"terms and conditions" factor can be made from the defendant's
perspective as well. If the factor allowed for subjective judgments,
defendants could be held liable for actions toward "particularly
sensitive" individuals, actions that would not amount to a violation
of the law if perpetrated upon "tougher" individuals. This tort
principle of taking the victim as you find him is out of place in an
area of the law that determines liability for decisions based on
group differences, rather than individual ones. To the extent that
the discrimination laws address problems that are largely social
and systemic, and not individual, subjectivity is out of place.
In sum, the courts' demand for proof of unwelcomeness from
82 Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F.Supp. 419, 430 (E.D.Mich. 1984), afl'd 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
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the victim of sexual harassment and the courts' willingness to examine the subjective feelings of the victim distinguish sexual harassment from other discrimination law actions, despite the courts'
declarations that harassment is simply another form of discrimination. Nowhere else in discrimination law do the courts approach a
problem so solicitously, demanding such a high level of moral
blame before finding liability.8
Why such selective treatment? One further example may highlight the reasons. The third element of the Henson test requires A
to allege that B would not have harassed her but for A's membership in a class. Commentators have described this but for test as a
strict standard.8 4 In practice, the courts have reduced the necessary showing to a simple inquiry into sexual orientation. Thus, A
need only state that heterosexual B would not have harassed A had
A not been a member of the opposite sex, or that homosexual B
would not have harassed A had A not been of B's gender. But if B
is bisexual, harassing both sexes, A cannot pass this test. Many
courts have observed that, under this formula, a bisexual harasser
would escape liability entirely. 5
Sexual harassment case law is, to say the least, not replete
with instances of bisexuals harassing with impunity.86 But one's
emotional response to the possibility that a harasser could escape
liability is instructive. When the courts look only to sexual orientation in applying the but for test, they assume that the harasser's
orientation indicates his motivation. Usually this is a correct assumption: since the discrimination laws require the courts to determine if the harasser based his decision as to whom to harass on a
prohibited classification, and since sexual orientation implies a
preference for one gender over the other, the harasser's orientation
83 The current EEOC explicitly recognizes this, and believes that it is necessary. See
notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
" See, for example, Brodin, 82 Colum.L.J. at 309 (cited in note 67); Zimmer and Sullivan, 9 Harv.Women's L.J. at 45 (cited in note 71).
" See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55; Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n.11; Vinson, 760 F.2d at
1333 n.7 (Bork dissenting).
This sort of problem can arise in any harassment-as-discrimination action, sexual, racial, or otherwise. In the race context, see Bradford v. Sloan Paper Co., 383 F. Supp. 1157
(N.D.Ala. 1974) (harasser argues that he treats everyone badly, regardless of race, color,
religion, or national origin).
86 If the problem arose, liability for the harasser is not inconceivable. There would be
no liability only if one adheres to the orientation analysis. One could abandon that analysis
in a case involving a bisexual, and question why the harasser chose one victim over another.
If gender stereotypes were a but for cause of the decision (for example, if the bisexual harasses his female secretary because he believes "that's what female secretaries are for"),
then the bisexual would have discriminated illegally.
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often will explain why he chose as he did. But the riddle of the
bisexual harasser remains. One would think as a result that, in order to solve this riddle, courts would reject the sexual orientation
analysis and substitute in its place a test that would impose liability for any decision based on sexuality.
The problem is that the concern of the discrimination laws in
sexual harassment cases is not discrimination based on sexuality,
but disparate treatment based on gender. The EEOC justified extending Title VII's protection to sexual harassment victims because it concluded that it was wrong to bar those claiming harassment based on one prohibited criteria, sex (gender), while allowing
those harassed on the basis of other prohibited criteria, such as
race, to bring their claims.87 Henson states the analogy explicitly:
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to
sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial
equality."88
But the Henson court went on to perpetuate the ambiguity
felt by so many courts that had preceded it. While it justifies Title
VII suits for sexual harassment by analogy to racial harassment,
the Henson court uses the word "sexual" elsewhere in its opinion
to mean not "of or relating to gender," but of or relating to sexuality." The majority of courts continue to define the term "sexual"
in sexual harassment suits brought under discrimination theories
in this way.90 The difference has had practical consequences. In
Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., the plaintiff argued that her male
supervisor had harassed her-not in a sexual manner, but by pick67

See 45 Fed.Reg. 25024.

" Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.
" For example, in defining unwelcome sexual harassment, the Henson court called on
the EEOC guidelines, which emphasize the sexual, rather than gender-based, nature of the
conduct. "Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature" are cited as examples of sexual harassment. Id. at 903, citing 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (1981).
90 See, for example, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2406 (unwelcome advance is the gravamen of the complaint); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th
Cir. 1983); Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F.Supp. 645, 649 (E.D.Mich. 1982). There
are some exceptions. See Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir.
1985) ("[H]arassment can be of at least two kinds: (1) threatening, bellicose, demeaning,
hostile or offensive conduct ... because of the sex of the victim of such conduct; or (2)
'unwelcome sexual advances' generally known as a 'quid pro quo' ground."); Horn v. Duke
Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (Title VII creates incentive for employers to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451

F.Supp. 1382, 1390 (D.Colo. 1978) (Title VII strikes at disparate treatment based on sex
stereotypes; "stereotype of the sexually-accommodating secretary is well documented").
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ing on her. Since he had allegedly singled her out for this treatment, she argued sexual harassment. The court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint, holding that in the sexual harassment context, "'[s]ex' . . . does not mean gender. Rather, it is used pursuant to its more popular meaning." The court concluded that if a
plaintiff alleges asexual disparate treatment, traditional disparate
treatment analysis must be followed, not the Henson scheme. 91
Henson's tendency to treat sexual harassment as sexuality
harassment holds at least one advantage over the alternative of
treating sexual harassment as gender harassment. By accepting
that sexuality is a legitimate inquiry, the Henson view allows
courts to use sexual orientation as a proxy for intent. As discussed
above, it is easier for a court to rely on the harasser's sexual orientation than to probe the harasser's actual motives. Plaintiffs under
the Henson scheme will be able to prove discriminatory causation
easily, unless the harasser is a bisexual.
One cannot deny, too, that the Henson view has an emotional
appeal as well: By focussing on sexual orientation, Henson indicts
harassers for their harassment, and not just their discrimination.
That the Henson approach satisfyingly addresses both wrongs explains why the notion of the liability-free bisexual harasser is upsetting. Practically speaking, the emotional appeal of Henson-that the courts are attacking two forms of "morally
blameworthy" conduct, harassment and discrimination-partially
explains why there are departures from discrimination theory in
92
sexual harassment cases.
Because sexual harassment involves a subject that often embarrasses and perplexes American society-sexual behavior-its
discriminatory aspects have been accorded special treatment. So
while the courts acknowledge that sexual harassment is discrimination based on gender, they continue to perpetuate some of the
myths and ambiguities that prevented the courts from understanding, or deterred them from deciding, the sexual harassment cases
in the first place. It is in this regard, and this regard alone, that
Judge Bork's dissent in Vinson is correct: some of the sexual harassment cases do use the discrimination laws as "bootstraps" for
91 618 F.Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (S.D.W.Va. 1985).
92 Several courts state this explicitly. The Henson court described quid pro quo harass-

ment as extortion. 682 F.2d at 910. Other courts claim the need to rid society of shocking
conduct. See Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 981 (D.C.App. 1984); Arnold v. City
of Seminole, Okl., 614 F.Supp. 853, 870 (E.D.Okla. 1985). Another court analogized sexual
harassment to prostitution. See Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir.
1984).
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other concerns. This has the effect of both enlarging and constricting the scope of discrimination liability.
Perhaps there is no way to keep sexuality concerns out of a
discrimination-oriented inquiry into sexual harassment. But if
courts are to attain the goals of the discrimination laws, they must
exercise their best efforts to separate sexual from discriminatory
offenses. This means that the courts should not manipulate discrimination theories in order to roam unnecessarily into the area of
sexual practices. Likewise, they should eschew those parts of the
Henson prima facie case that create a standard of moral culpability apart from that established in the discrimination laws
themselves.
B. Harassment As More Than Discrimination
Our examination so far has shown that the law recognizes sexual harassment as gender discrimination. Empirical studies, such
as Gutek's, confirm that this recognition is correct. Yet, in many
cases the courts have reached this recognition out of a sense of
outrage, rather than upon an empirical understanding of sexual
harassment as gender discrimination. Some argue that this is
wrong-that the federal courts should search only for discrimination, not for sexual immorality. Others object to court intrusions
into the individual's "personal" life, which raise (for them) free
speech and privacy concerns."
On the other hand, those who wish that the courts would address the problems raised by sexual interaction have their own objections to relying upon the discrimination laws to redress the injuries of harassment. They object that the bootstraps provided by
the discrimination laws are too short to remedy all of the harms of
harassment. For example, Title VII applies only to defined employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies. It exempts
small businesses, private membership clubs, religious organizations, and actions with respect to Communists. 4 It also declares a
s No defendant has argued in a reported case that his conduct is constitutionally protected. The Rabidue court expressed concern, however, that if Henson allows an inquiry
into the reasonableness of "verbal conduct of a sexual nature," a defendant might have a
valid First Amendment defense. 584 F.Supp. at 431. See also Snell v. Suffolk County, 611
F.Supp. 521, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986) (racial harassment
case; concerns about privacy interests suggest that "the courts not become involved in policing what citizens say and do in their homes and at social gatherings"). A greater analysis of
constitutionally protected harassment is beyond the scope of this comment.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (small businesses, Indian tribes, and tax-exempt, bona fide
private membership clubs other than labor organizations exempted); id. at § 2000e-(1) (reli-
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right to equal treatment only in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.9 5 Harassment from a co-worker outside of the
workplace, for example, is not actionable under Title VII unless
the employer has power over those activities. The other discrimination and civil rights laws have similar subject matter limitations.
Section 1983 applies only to state and municipal actions." Title IX
is limited to specific programs that receive federal funds. 7 The
Fair Housing Act exempts dwellings with less than four rental
units, and is inapplicable to most sales of homes completed without the services of a broker.9 "
Perhaps more importantly, the discrimination laws vary in
their remedies. Title VII, for example, provides only equitable relief." For the plaintiff in Henson, this meant that once she had left
her job, she was not entitled to an injunction against her former
employer's practices, nor could she recover for pain and suffering. 0 0 Also, punitive damages are not permitted under Title VII.
By contrast, in § 1983 and Fair Housing actions, an assortment of
remedies ranging from injunctions to punitive damages is available. 101 Title IX presents the most confusion in this area, with many
courts limiting remedies to a cutoff of federal funds or injunctive
relief. The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that in Title IX
cases involving intentional acts, wider relief may be available.' 0 2

gious organizations); id. at § 2000e-(2)(f) (Communists).
Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
"
Id. at § 1983 (applying to persons who act "under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia").
97 See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 572-74 (1984).
98 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
100 682 F.2d at 905. In the absence of an equitable remedy, the plaintiff may not be
entitled to attorney's fees either. See Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184
(7th Cir. 1986), for cases on both sides of this issue.
10I Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 3612.
'02 This confusion arises, in part, from the evolution of Title IX case law. Congress
modeled Title IX on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). Few
plaintiffs, if any, have brought harassment suits under Title VI, and so harassment case law
under Title IX has had to emerge on its own, albeit in the shadow of Title VI. In Lieberman
v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1981), the court determined that as a
matter of statutory construction, only injunctive and administrative relief, as well as attorney's fees, were available to successful Title IX claimants. But in Guardians Association v.
Civil Service Commission of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983), a Title VI racial discrimination action, Justice White noted that while plaintiffs suing on congressional acts passed pursuant to the Spending Clause usually are not entitled to remedies which aim to make the
plaintiff whole, in cases of intentional discrimination "it may be that the victim. . . should
be entitled to a compensatory award, as well as prospective relief. . . " Because the plaintiffs in Guardiansdid not allege intentional discrimination, White's statement is dicta, but
his reasoning suggests that the Lieberman decision is wrong.
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The discrimination laws are thus an incomplete solution to the
problems that harassment poses. Society's general interests regarding sexual harassment may best be understood by reference to
both discrimination and tort law. Through its discrimination laws,
society prohibits discrimination where it operates to bar people
from opportunities in areas such as employment, housing, and education. The judiciary serves this mandate by determining when
statutes have been violated and administering statutory remedies.
Society also relies upon the courts, through mechanisms such as
tort law, to compensate those who have been unjustly harmed by
others, and to dissuade people from engaging in future injurious
practices. 10 3 The problem with respect to sexual harassment is that
the courts have not approached these two different tasks systematically. We thus return to the questions posed to the courts over ten
years ago: what is it about sexual harassment that offends societal
interests, and what can the legal system do to correct it?
III.
It should not be surprising that there is confusion over how to
remedy sexual harassment. Discrimination arises from complex
motives that are both personal and societal. The original thrust of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was directed only at personal discrimination, in part because Congress itself did not fully understand the
problem it sought to correct. Discrimination was seen as a product
of "ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual or organization." But within eight years, Congress came to describe the problem as being more systemic than personal. 10 4 The tension between
these views is understandably greater when the element of sexuality is present. To this extent, the holdings in Train and Williams
are both correct: sexual harassment can be both improper personal
conduct and discriminatory behavior.
One can isolate the harms more specifically. There are three
potential wrongs arising from sexual harassment: (A) it is a form of
illegal discrimination, defined as behavior that can impose barriers
on the basis of an improper classification-gender-to equal opportunity in socially protected spheres, such as employment, education, and housing; (B) it is behavior that society feels is inappro103 See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts chap. 2 (cited at note 14). See also
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.15 (3d ed. 1986) (intentional torts constitute a coerced transfer of wealth in a setting of low transaction costs, violating market efficiency principles).
'" Sen.Rep.No. 92-415 at 5 (cited in note 21).
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priate in certain contexts such as public transportation, education
and housing; and (C) it is behavior that violates general, ill-defined
societal standards of "decency," regardless of context. 10 5 Each of
these harms should be analyzed separately so that their differences
are not lost. There are several reasons why this is critical to proper
adjudication and relief.
First, the legal analysis of discrimination and other barriers to
equal opportunity is largely a matter of statutory interpretation,
while the analysis of torts entails sifting through both statutory
and common law principles. The courts balance issues, afford presumptions, and defer to legislatures one way when interpreting
statutes, and in another way when expounding the common law.10 6
Second, because society arguably has discrete opinions on each of
these harms, judicial commingling of the issues hampers society's
ability to discern the law and assert the public values that govern
the issues. 07 Judicial confusion thwarts the goal of coordinate consensus building by the legislative and judicial branches.
A third and related reason for separating the issues is to mitigate juror bias. If, for example, a community feels that fanny slapping is acceptable, but the practice interferes with an individual
federal right to equal employment opportunity, the local tolerance
of the personal conduct (and the possible reluctance to award damages for it) should not lead to derogation of the employee's federal
right. By the same token, absent congressional intent to preempt
state or local regulation, the federal law should not be used to intrude upon local definitions of tortious conduct.'
106

Some courts have made similar classifications in cases where plaintiffs have attached

tort claims to their discrimination claims. See Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F.Supp. 891, 897
(D.D.C. 1982) (Title VII claim along with pendent claims of assault, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F.Supp. 909 (E.D.Pa.
1983) (discussion of Title VII, Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 117 L.R.R.M. 2583 (Or. 1984)
(discussion of Title VII, Oregon employment discrimination statute, and wrongful discharge
claims); Howard University, 484 A.2d 958 (discussion of D.C. Human Rights Act and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).
'0 The early courts' concern about a flood of harassment-related litigation is a good
example. The amount of potential litigation should be a minor consideration in construing
Title VII, as Congress is presumed to have anticipated (or should have anticipated) the
judicial costs of the statute when it enacted Title VII and when it amended Title VII in
1972. By contrast, the number of potential suits could be a major consideration in judicial
extension of a common law doctrine, as the judiciary is effectively the legislature in that
instance.
107 Some argue that such value discernment should be the key function of the adversary
system. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law 93-104 (1984).
'08 One can limit the effects of local preferences by reducing the number of subjective
elements within the discrimination count, which would otherwise allow for a greater degree
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Finally, separating the causes of action helps society reach the
desired level of deterrence and compensation. Under most discrimination statutes, a defendant is strictly liable for his discriminatory
conduct, whereas under common law principles of liability, a defendant is responsible only for that tortious behavior which is negligent. The causes of action should be split so as to maintain the
proper incentives to sue and to refrain from objectionable conduct.
A suggested model for analyzing sexual harassment is
presented below. This scheme permits redress of the three harms
of sexual harassment, and avoids some of the problems of the current approach to sexual harassment-problems that can result in
over- or under-compensation.
A. Harassment as Discrimination-The Revised Henson Proof
As discussed in Part IIA, the "unwelcomeness" and "terms
and conditions" elements of the Henson analysis diverge from the
purposes of the discrimination laws. Although sexual harassment is
a peculiar form of discrimination, its peculiarities are simply the
sexual factors that are involved in harassment, not any unique
twist to the principle of disparate treatment. Thus the courts
should not distinguish harassment from other forms of
discrimination. 10 9
The prima facie case of sexual harassment under the discrimination laws should thus be that for disparate treatment generally,
which is:
(1) A is a member of a protected group.
(2) B intentionally acted with respect to A."'0
(3) B would not have acted with respect to A but for A's
membership in the group.
(4) B's action would have prevented the average member of
A's group from achieving equal opportunity in a sphere of interest that the government wishes to protect.""
of fact finder bias to enter into the decision.
109 One writer on the issue of employer liability for sexual harassment makes this same
argument for applying traditional standards of vicarious liability for discrimination to harassment suits. See Note, 87 Colum.L.Rev. at 1275-76 (cited in note 64).
110 This element serves to make this a "treatment" case, like McDonnell Douglas, as
opposed to an "impact" case, like Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Illegal disparity is proven in the third element.
Ronna Greff Schneider, in Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 Tex.L.Rev.
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(5) The discrimination statute targets people in B's position.
This statement of the case has two advantages. First, it does
what Henson purported to do: that is, align all actions involving
harassment. In the racial, religious, and national origin contexts, it
is disparate treatment according to the victim's membership in a
class that is the issue. The same should hold true for sexual harassment. 11 2 This revised analysis sets a common standard for all forms
of disparate treatment.
Second, the proposed model removes the unnecessary showing
of unwelcomeness. As empirical studies have shown, all of the
motivations behind sexual advances in the workplace contain discrimination. To purge the workplace of discriminatory barriers to
equal opportunity, it should be presumed that a sexual advance, if
it imposes such a barrier, is unlawful discrimination. 1 3 Employers
should have the same incentives to combat sexual harassment as
they have to eradicate other kinds of discrimination. By correctly
allocating the burdens of proof, the courts can help maintain the
proper level of deterrence. As with other discrimination actions,
the defendant will always have the opportunity to assert a defense
in order to defeat the presumption of unlawful conduct. Current
law, however, begins with the presumption that a sexual advance is
permissible until proven unwelcome. 1 A presumption consistent
with the general body of discrimination law is that a sexual advance is discrimination, unless the one making the advance can
provide a justification.
B. Advances in Inappropriate Contexts-A New Harassment
Tort
The court in Tomkins I pointed out that Title VII was not
intended to give a federal tort remedy for sexual attacks simply
because they occurred in the workplace, and not the "back al525, 536-39 (1987), concurs in this revision of the fouth element.
112 The Eleventh Circuit may have already recognized this. See the definition of harassment used in Bell, 777 F.2d at 1503, described in note 90.
'Is When one starts from the opposite presumption, one can slip all too easily into reasoning that ultimately subverts the purposes of discrimination law. For example, in Jackson-Coley v. Corps of Engineers, 43 F.E.P. Cases 617, 620 (E.D.Mich. 1987), the court construed "voluntariness" to mean that the victim must show that the advance was unwelcome
"in the sense that the employee deliberately and clearly makes her nonreceptiveness known
to the alleged offender." Although the court's construction was only dicta, one cannot imagine the same court requiring a black employee, for example, to state "deliberately and
clearly" his desire not to be insulted on account of his race.
11I See notes 72-79 and accompanying text on the unwelcomeness standard.
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ley."' " Congressional intent and the limited remedies under Title
VII (namely, its lack of an actual damages provision) support the
Tomkins I court's contention: Title VII's concern is discrimination,
not tort.
Nevertheless, few could disagree that sexual harassment is
often tortious. Tortiousness often depends upon the context in
which behavior occurs. For example, consider the difference between unwelcome sexual advances at a singles bar and those in the
workplace. Discrimination alone does not explain the intuitive difference. One can posit two possible explanations for the relative
appropriateness of the behavior: (1) Being at a singles bar indicates welcomeness, while being at work does not; (2) Society expects greater care to be taken at work, while no such expectation
governs conduct at a singles bar.
The first proposition is an incomplete rationale. It may explain why the advance at the nightclub is not so bad. One may go
to a club to improve one's chances of receiving an advance. But
does one go to work in hopes of avoiding an advance? To be sure,
one might not expect or desire an advance at work, but going to
work can hardly be treated as an assertion of unwelcomeness.
The second theory better explains the difference between the
advance at a nightclub and the advance at the workplace: society
imposes a higher standard of care in the workplace than in a bar.
This reflects the understanding that in certain situations, power
may be allocated so as to exacerbate the harms of objectionable
conduct. In quid pro quo harassment cases, for example, the supervisor backs up his request for sexual favors with an express or implied threat of reprisal. One can describe this situation either from
the employer's viewpoint, and call it extortion, 11 6 or from the employee's position, and call it an imposition of a cruel choice between tolerating the harassment or forfeiting an important benefit.
In co-worker environmental harassment, the workplace may not
vest one worker with extortionate power over his colleague, but the
victim's dependence on her job still may present her with the same
no-win choice.117 The choice seems less cruel in the nightclub example only because of the (arguably) lesser values at stake: the vic-

Tomkins I, 422 F.Supp. at 556.
As did Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
"7 Many have noted how the extortion component of sexual harassment makes it odious. See, for example, Note, 76 Mich.L.Rev. at 1007 n.2 (cited at note 64); MacKinnon at 1
(cited at note 15); John B. Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of
Sexual Harassment, 51 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1, 21-23 (1982); Note, 97 Harv.L.Rev. at 1451 (cited at
note 64).
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tim can put up with harassment or find alternative
entertainment.1 1 8
The legal system frequently makes such contextual distinctions. Apart from the discrimination laws, one example is § 48 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: "A common carrier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing
its facilities for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the utility's servants while otherwise acting within the
scope of their employment." The explanation given above as to
why society values certain contexts over others explains the special
instance of § 48 liability: common carriers and public utilities provide highly valued services; forcing a patron to run a gauntlet of
abuse to obtain those services presents the patron with a choice
that society will not tolerate. 1 9
Section 48 provides a model for determining liability for sexual harassment in inappropriate contexts. In fact, some of the early
sexual harassment cases used theories similar to § 48 to impose
liability on the offender. 2 0 A prima facie case of harassment similar to this theory would be:
(1) A sought to participate in a special activity (e.g. tenancy, 12 1 school, 22 or work 23).
128 Of course, both situations contain imbalances of power, albeit ones of different de-

grees. The supervisor clearly can withhold a benefit. The lascivious nightclub patron, by
contrast, cannot ask the person who rebuffs his advance to leave. But to the extent that
other patrons tolerate, if not encourage, the advancer's conduct, the person who rebuffs the
advance will have to withdraw-if not to home or another club, at least to another corner of
the bar. Thus, one situation seems worse than the other only because of a judgment that
work is more valuable than entertainment, not because the imposed choice is warranted in
one context and not the other. On a positive note, however, the law helps shape values. Title
IX, for example, embodies a judgment that discrimination in athletic programs is as damaging as discrimination in classroom education. See Brenden v. Indep. School Dist., 477 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
1" See § 48 comment (a) ("value of the rule lies in the incentive which it provides for
the selection of employees who will not be grossly discourteous to those who must come in
contact with them;" liability based on "the public duty").
120

See note 12.

121

The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b).

12 As for education, see Jerry v. Board of Education of the City of Syracuse, 35 N.Y.2d

534, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446 (1974) (teacher slept with student, used profane language in
classroom; "conduct directly affects the performance of the professional responsibilities of
the teacher" and hence presents grounds for discharge); Kilpatrick v. Wright, 437 F.Supp.
397, 399 (M.D.Ala. 1977) (teacher made advances toward female students; "The sexual improprieties for which [the teacher] is being discharged cannot be tolerated in the classroom.
The threat to the healthy mental development of impressionable young minds is obvious.")
Micari v. Mann, 126 Misc.2d 422, 481 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970, 324 N.E.2d 106 (1984) (students'
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from sexual harassment by
teacher held to allege outrageous conduct; punitive damages warranted for such "reprehensible" behavior). See also Schneider, 65 Tex.L.Rev. at 550-53 (cited at note 111).
123 See text accompanying notes 115-18 regarding the special nature of the employment
relation in emotional distress actions.
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(2) B harassed A.
(3) B's harassment unreasonably harmed A.
(4) B holds a position with respect to the special activity that
creates a duty for B towards people in A's position.
Such a cause of action has several advantages. The first element allows for discussion of what activities should require a
stricter standard of freedom from harassment. 124 So far, employment, housing, and education have stood out as three such special
areas of activity. They are unique not merely because Title VII,
the Fair Housing Act, and Title IX say they are. The case law involving torts in employment and school demonstrates many instances where the courts have imposed stricter standards of liability out of a sense that these areas are somehow special. If there are
additional environments that require this type of protection, 125 the
first element of the cause of action outlined above allows for that
future development.
Second, this tort theory provides relief for some victims of sexual harassment who cannot obtain relief under the discrimination
laws. Under this scheme, the bisexual harasser is liable, as are
others who escape the discrimination laws' subject matter and remedial limitations. The corollary to this imposition of liability is
that providers of certain opportunities will have the incentive to
keep them free of harassment.
Third, this theory adopts a standard of liability that parallels
other emotional interest torts and avoids the strict liability scheme
of the discrimination laws. Here the court should examine the subjective factors that were purged in the revised Henson proof, because here the context of the advance is a critical and legitimate
aspect of the scheme. Courts also will be able to employ their extensive experience gained from other civil actions in order to avoid
the supposedly inherent proof and remoteness problems cited by
124 This represents another instance where clearer judicial discernment of legal issues
and values might help legislatures to respond better to societal pressure for reform.
12 The doctor-patient relationship may present one such context. Malpractice actions
currently remedy some of the abuses of this relationship. See Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc.2d
350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1975). Some states have passed statutes to deal with the problem.
See Fla.Stat.Annot. §§ 401.411(h), 466.027, 466.028(k), 490.009(2)(k), and 490.0111 (West
1980 & 1987 Supp.); Minn.Stat.Annot. § 609.343 (West. 1983 & 1987 Supp.).
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the early courts in assessing damages for the offense of sexual
harassment.
One disadvantage of this approach is that judge-made revisions to doctrine, unlike statutory reforms, do not provide potential offenders with advance notice of their liability. While the problem of lack of notice as to groups presently exempted by the
discrimination statutes is not troubling-the publicity that the
sexual harassment cases generate is too great for one to argue that
there is no notice as to the propriety of certain egregious acts of
harassment-the lack of notice with regard to the declaration of
new special activities is troublesome. Statutory extension would be
126
more prudent, especially given the obscurity of the § 48 cases.
C.

The Outrageous Advance: Reasserting Current Theories

The final harm to be addressed is that resulting from advances
that, regardless of context, violate societal standards of "decency."
The most well known tort that addresses such harms is that for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Curiously, employer liability for emotional distress stemming from alleged harassment has
been widening almost concurrently with the development of sexual
harassment actions under the discrimination laws. The reasons for
this, in all likelihood, are the same as those for the increase in discrimination liability in general: an unprecedented increase in numbers of women and minorities in jobs traditionally held by white
males, and concomitant changing attitudes about proper workplace
conduct.
The traditional elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress do not suggest that this expansion was inevitable. In defining the tort, § 46 of the Restatement speaks in terms
of "extreme and outrageous conduct" causing "severe emotional
distress. '121 The courts, however, have watered down the Restatement's adjectives, at least in cases involving harassment at the
workplace. The landmark case is Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering,Inc.
There, a black employee's white supervisor cast racial epithets at
126 At press time, a LEXIS search revealed only two discussions of § 48 in case law. See
Williams v. School Dist. of Springfield R-12, 447 S.W.2d 256, 266-67 (Mo. 1969); Dawson v.
Zayre Department Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa.Super. 1985). For examples of statutory
declarations of special spheres of interest, albeit not for purposes of tort liability, see the
statutes listed in note 125.
1217Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm."

1988]

The Harms of Asking

him. The employee alleged humiliation, mental anguish, and physical distress. The court noted that while mere insults do not
amount to outrageous conduct, "aggravated circumstances" can
make insults outrageous. One such circumstance was the employment relation.12
One could read Alcorn in one of two ways: either the employment context made the insult actionable, or else the threshold of
outrageousness is lower for some insults than for others. Earlier it
was concluded that the evil of some activities was that they forced
the victim to make a no-win choice. The court in Alcorn does not
express such a concern, nor have any of the courts that have
granted relief in sexual harassment cases on grounds of intentional
infliction of emotional distress."29
Thus the cases indicate that the second description of the Alcorn holding-the threshold for outrageousness is lower for some
insults than for others-may be the more accurate one. A close examination of the nominally different standards of liability in intentional infliction and discrimination claims bears this out. The standard in intentional infliction cases is "extreme and outrageous"
conduct, while the Henson court's discrimination standard is "unreasonable interference." But when claims for emotional injury
have accompanied discrimination claims (either pursuant to a discrimination statute that awards actual damages or as a pendent
state claim), plaintiffs have won their cases without a rigorous
showing that the unreasonable interference amounted to outrageous behavior. 13 0 This development suggests that courts recognize
sexual harassment as an insult warranting redress even when the
conduct at issue is something less than "extreme and outrageous."
The apparent collapse of the outrageousness standard into the
unreasonable interference standard is by no means complete. If
12 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216, 218 n.2, 219 (1970).
129 For cases where both discrimination and intentional infliction occurred, see Rogers
v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F.Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981); Stewart, 538 F.Supp. at 891;
Shaffer, 565 F.Supp. at 909; Howard University, 484 A.2d at 958; Priest v. Rotary, 634
F.Supp. 571 (N.D.Cal. 1986). Only the Priest case included evidence beyond the fact of
workplace harassment that lay a foundation for liability under the theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The Restatement suggests that one reason to impose a different standard of outrageousness for a particular group of people may be to remedy situations in which the conduct
"arise[s] from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives
him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests." The Restatement gives as examples police officers, school authorities, landlords, and debt collectors.
Restatement at § 46 comment (e) and Illustrations 5-8.
13o See cases cited in note 105.
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one could not prove that the discriminatory harassment amounted
to an unreasonable barrier to employment, he could not prove that
it was extreme. But perhaps our society feels that sexual harassment by an employer, teacher, landlord, or doctor is outrageous in
and of itself. If this is true, then plaintiffs who can prove emotional
harms should always plead intentional infliction of emotional distress in sexual harassment cases, so as to benefit from society's
changing attitudes toward proper sexual behavior and power distributions. Moreover, victims of sexual harassment can play a role
in shaping the legal contours of unacceptable sexual advances. Not
only does litigation deter offensive conduct, but it serves to raise
community awareness of the problem in general. By asserting a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment plaintiffs force the legal system to weigh the harasser's conduct against society's view of outrageousness-a standard that is
apparently ever changing and responding to developing conceptions of social responsibilities.
CONCLUSION

The inadequacies in the laws covering sexual harassment stem
from many sources. Some are a product of historical twists. Others
reflect the problems of relying upon statutes that were not specific
or comprehensive solutions to sexual harassment. But most are a
result of trying to push sexual harassment into one tidy legal theory. This cannot be done. Sexual harassment reflects both personal
and societal difficulties. One must respond to it with measures directed at society and at the person; education is the best tool, with
tort remedies following somewhere behind. The public and private
arenas both require consensus, however, to achieve the proper result-consensus on which areas should be free of discrimination,
which realms must be free from even mild sexual extortion, and
what behavior is too outrageous to tolerate.
The courts have made great strides over the last ten years in
curbing sexual harassment. They have gone from believing that
there is no harm in asking to an understanding that there is harm
caused by asking. In so doing, they have implied that there can be
harm in the act of asking itself. The next step requires the courts
to define that harm and set to the task of preventing and remedying it.

